Putting VW’s diesel scandal in context

By Christopher A. Sawyer
The Virtual Driver

(September 25, 2015) According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, both it and the California Air Resources Board (CARB) uncovered software in model year 2009-2015 Volkswagen and Audi cars with four-cylinder EA189 diesels designed to defeat the emission protocols in normal use. The so-called defeat device contains software code that recognizes when the vehicle’s emissions are being tested, and switches to full emissions control during the test.


Once the test is done, the car reverts to a state wherein it produces nitrous oxide (NOx) emissions up to 40 times the regulated level.

An independent analysis conducted by researchers at West Virginia University and the International Council on Clean Transportation produced consistent anomalies between emissions from these vehicles in test and on-road states, which prompted a call to the regulatory agencies. Later, VW admitted its small diesel engines were fitted with the defeat device. Not long afterward, it suggested that this software cheat was on every small diesel in the EA189 engine family.

(A new diesel family, EA288, was launched in calendar year 2014. The controllers these engines use contain the software cheat, though it is unclear if it is active or a remnant of earlier code that could not be removed without rewriting the engine control program or alerting VW executives and governmental authorities as to its existence.)

Compared to what?

Certification tests conducted by the EPA in 2014 showed that a VW Jetta SportWagen powered by the previous generation 2.0-liter turbo diesel produced 0.035 g/mile of NOx. Using the EPA’s assertion that this combination’s real world emissions are up to “40 times higher,” that places its on-road NOx performance at a maximum 1.4 grams/mile. In other words, the suspect VW diesels are cleaner than a 1978-1980 U.S. passenger car, and only slightly (0.02 g/mile) dirtier than a 1988-1995 light truck in terms of NOx emissions.

This is not to excuse VW’s criminality or stupidity. It is meant to put the scandal into context. VW says the software affects nearly 500,000 cars sold in the U.S. and perhaps as many as 11 million vehicles worldwide. This excess of 1.365 g/mile of NOx equates to 682,500 g/mile for the 500,000 cars in the U.S., and 15,015,000 g/mile worldwide. Assuming an average of 15,000 miles/year, this means that every year these cars add 225,225,000,000 grams of NOx worldwide, of which 10,237,500,000 grams are created in the U.S.

That sounds like a lot, and it is. However, when translated into pounds, the numbers become a bit more manageable. The global NOx excess is 496,536,130 lb./year, while the U.S. number is 22,569,824 lb./year. These are still large numbers. There is, however, a larger number: 38 trillion. That’s the weight of the atmosphere above the continental United States in tons. (This can also be expressed as 760,000,000,000,000,000 or 7.6 x 1016 lb.)

The atmosphere recirculates every seven to 10 days as it moves across the globe, and is made up of nitrogen (78%), oxygen (21%), argon (1%), and trace amounts of carbon dioxide, neon, helium, methane, krypton, hydrogen, nitrous oxide, xenon, ozone, iodine, carbon monoxide and ammonia. (At lower altitudes, this list also includes water vapor.) Thus, in the U.S. the yearly excess NOx produced by these nearly 500,000 VWs is just under 3x10-12 percent of the total atmosphere.

That’s 0.000000000003%. We can expect the global number to be similarly small.

Been there, done that

In the short term, VW is on the rocks in the U.S., and around the world.In other words, it’s barely a blip on the radar, yet it has created a firestorm of controversy fed by the 24-hour news cycle, presidential politics, and the visit to the U.S. of a pope whose deep-seated mistrust of capitalism and belief in global warming is driving the narrative.

For those for whom this brouhaha does not turn on environmentalist or anti-capitalist leanings, it underscores the naked arrogance of the Germans and VW in particular. For them, not only is this a mortal wound that could destroy the world’s largest automaker, it is one that proves their view of VW (and of Germans in general) to be correct.

Nonsense.

The unintended acceleration scandal hyped by consumer advocates and 60 Minutes severely wounded Audi, but did not destroy it. In fact, in a 30-year comeback that would make Friedrich Nietzsche (“What does not kill me makes me stronger.”) very proud, Audi has climbed its way out of the depths of that hole to the heights of the luxury market.

There is no reason to expect any less for its parent, VW, in this crisis, especially now that its chairman has resigned and many executives — especially those in R&D — have been broomed. In fact, it may not take anything like 30 years for it to recover. Ford rebounded quickly after it was discovered in the 1970s that it had falsified emission testing data. In 1998, Honda was charged with placing a device to disable misfire monitors on 1.6 million vehicles.

Later that year, Ford was accused of installing defeat devices on 600,000 Econoline vans. Both recovered after time and millions of dollars in fines passed by. As did Hyundai after it overstated the fuel economy of a number of models by several miles per gallon. And this came on the heels of Ford having to lower the fuel economy estimates of the C-Max Hybrid. Few remember these incidents today.

What sets VW’s case apart, however, is the fact that the International Council on Clean Transportation and West Virginia University’s original findings — sent to the EPA and CARB in May 2014 — resulted in a software update to fix the NOx trap and selective catalyst reduction technology faults that caused the higher in-use emissions. When retested by CARB officials in May of this year using portable emission measurement systems, the NOx numbers were still well above the applicable standard.

Two months later, after technical meetings with CARB and EPA, VW admitted the vehicles contain a second emission calibration subroutine designed only to run while the cars were being tested. That’s when the proverbial scheisse hit the fan. It was’t the crime that sparked the furor (though sins against the planet are as close as one can get to treason these days), but the naked duplicity that rankled.

The fallout

Audi is caught up in the diesel scandal as it shares VWs engines. Though the new EA288 diesel (shown here in an A3) has the suspect software, it's too early to tell if it has been used in this application.This scandal has yet to be played out, but certain things are almost guaranteed to happen. Dr. Winterkorn’s resignation from his post as CEO of the Volkswagen Group, and the firing of several top-level executives are the very minimum steps VW’s board must take.

Audi is caught up in the diesel scandal as it shares VWs engines. Though the new EA288 diesel (shown here in an A3) has the suspect software, it's too early to tell if it has been used in this application

Unfortunately, this will not keep the spate of nascent class action lawsuits from growing. They will be bundled into one massive class action suit that will result in a sizable monetary settlement that benefits the lawyers more than the owners of the affected VW vehicles or, for that matter, the environment. VW dealers will refresh the engine controllers of the suspect cars with a new software program that eliminates the software cheat, and this may cause the fuel economy, performance and longevity of these engines to decline.*

To compensate, the engine warranties will be extended on these cars, owners will be offered a discount on the purchase of a new VW, and all will be given a MasterCard or Visa gift card. Its face amount will be equivalent to the difference between the old and new average fuel economy based on a set yearly mileage and the average price of diesel on the day of the settlement. These, however, are only the surface changes. Many other things will take place away from the public eye.

In an effort to extract a large fine and VW’s acquiescence toward its environmental goals, the Obama administration will turn the Justice Department loose on the case. With all the subtlety of surgery with an unsharpened axe, you can expect it to paint the company as a major environmental despoiler, and threaten to indict VW under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. Though VW already has set aside nearly $8.0 billion to extricate itself from this morass, the U.S. government will ask for the full $18 billion allowed by the law, and negotiate this down to a “more reasonable” amount as VW knuckles under to pressure from the Feds.

I expect them to extract from VW promises to greatly increase its electric and hybrid fleets, and potentially eliminate the sale of diesels in the U.S. market by a date certain. I have no doubt the UAW will offer to negotiate with its administration and congressional friends on VW’s behalf, but this, too, will come at a price. That price will be the full-scale recognition of the UAW at VW’s Chattanooga plant, and the promise that any major production expansion within the VW Group take place in the U.S. where it will be overseen by the UAW.

In addition, an environmental fund will be created with proceeds from the settlement, and it will be used to push renewable energy, ride sharing, electric vehicles, and more. VW will be on the board of this entity with numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Some of this money will be used to urge the EPA to investigate other automakers, and to lobby congress for sweeping new regulatory powers for the agency.

What will not change is this: Germany will continue to dictate product and pricing to the U.S. and other markets. VW cars will continue to exhibit average reliability and higher than normal repair costs. And the public will forget this all happened before three years are gone.

*One reason VW may have use the software cheat is to prevent the intake valves and plenum from becoming encrusted with what is best described as “goo” — a baked-on yet viscous substance that is the bane of direct injection engines of every stripe. It is made up of remnants of the fuel vapor, and contains a high percentage of entrained air. This combination, when brought into contact with the slightly cooler intake valves and combustion chamber, bakes onto the surface where is adsorbs and desorbs carbon. Drivability and fuel economy decline as these carbon deposits on steroids coke the inside of the engine.

The Virtual Driver